



**Peace War and Defense**

**Iranian Grand Strategy**

**reshaping the middle east**

**PWAD 680**

**Academic Year 2015-2016**

**Fall Semester**

**Location TBD, Monday or Thursday After 3pm is Ideal**

 Dr. Tony Rivera

Assistant Professor of International Security

 tonyrivera.ndu@gmail.com

 (c) 305.924.5305

 http://tonyrivera.net

 <http://css-lucas.com>

 Office hours: TBD



**Course Introduction**

This course is designed to introduce students to, and promote understanding of, Iran’s grand strategy and how it is impacting the Middle East region and beyond. While Iran is understood to be an important regional actor, there is *still* little understanding of its history, its strategic intent, its capability and reach, and, perhaps more importantly how these elements interact to produce a grand strategy that challenges the status quo. This course will investigate the following question in depth: What is Iran’s Grand Strategy? Relatedly, this course will seek answers for the following questions. 1) What are the foundations of Iranian power? 2) How has the current strategic culture emerged? 3) How does Iran project power? 4) What are the elements of that power? And 5) what are the best ways to approach strategic interaction with Iran?

To do so this course is organized into three sections. Section I introduces theoretical and historical approaches to analyze and understand the background and formation of Iran’s grand strategy. It locates part of the answer in Iran’s strategic orientation as resistance to U.S. power. Section II concentrates on the several domains in which Iran is active and how Iran projects power in these domains: diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and technological. The final section of this course will assess extant analysis and examine potential strategic policy choices for the U.S.

Students who complete “Iranian Grand Strategy” should demonstrate the ability to:

* Understand the origins of the Iranian ideology of resistance
* Understand the nature and scope of Iranian power
* Understand the practical application of Iranian power across multiple domains
* Understand the regional context within which these projections of power are cast and their effects
* Apply classroom theories to relevant domains and facilitate understanding of how and why Iran is engaging in certain activities
* Assess Iranian grand strategy holistically and
* Asses U.S. policy towards Iran

**Course Requirements**

The first and most important rule is that we are all to be courteous and respectful of the opinions of others. Some of the issues discussed in this seminar may be considered controversial. In order to facilitate discussion/academic freedom we must have an environment in which each member can speak freely and thoughtfully.

The required readings listed for each topic must be read before class meets. The faculty has selected the readings for their relevance, quality of ideas, readability, and timeliness. Supplemental readings are offered for background reference and for those who might wish to pursue a particular topic in greater depth, but they are neither required nor reprinted. They are particularly useful as additional sources for papers and in-class presentations.

The specific graded elements of the course are:

1. **Class Contribution and Attendance**: Students are expected to attend ***each*** class. For students to be excused from class they must produce documentation from the appropriate administrator. Students are also expected to have read the assigned readings and to be prepared for class discussion. Students are encouraged to use the “Study Questions” in each section as a guideline for the topics that will be discussed in class. Students are required to leave comments on the topic discussion board for that week and review all comments before coming to class*. Class contribution constitutes 20% of the final grade*.
2. **Presentation:**Each student will give a 15 minute presentation to the class to kickoff discussion on that particular week’s topic. There will also be a Q&A period after the presentation. These presentations must follow the rubric that will be distributed separately. Presentations are not to be regurgitation of readings, but offer some insight—historical, comparative, or analytical. Arguments should be constructed utilizing evidence from the week’s readings. Topics (which week and issue area) will be chosen during the first week. There will be no student presentations for week 1. *Presentations will comprise 15% of the final grade.*
3. **Current Events:** The materials in this course are historical, theoretical, and broad in nature. The application of these themes to current events is a critical part of learning and understanding. Therefore each student must be informed of current events and spend at least 15 minutes reading news articles. Each week, **all** students will share what they learned from the news and how it relates to our class discussions. To better prepare to discuss these events students will prepare a brief memo, no more than two pages, with at least three questions on a third page. *Memos and current event discussion will constitute 10%*
4. **Final Paper**: Students will complete a research paper based on the questions relating to each week. *The paper and its components will comprise 55 percent of the course grade.* Students should select their topics and turn in an annotated outline with clear thesis statement by **9 October**. This will be graded and considered 10% of the final grade. By **13 November** students must submit a five page rough draft of the paper. This will be graded and considered 10% of the final grade. The draft ***must*** include revisions from instructor comments on annotated outline. Students are strongly encouraged to meet with the professor to discuss paper topics, outlines, and drafts. The full remaining 35% of the paper grade will be assessed on the following:
	1. **Required Format**: The body of the paper should be 15–20 pages, double-spaced, 12-point Times New Roman font, with standard 1.25 inch margins. It is expected that all papers will be properly referenced with footnotes, paginated, and have a bibliography. Please refer to the *Chicago Manual of Style* for the correct format.
	2. **Final papers are due on the last day our class meets**. **Early submissions are welcomed and encouraged. No late submissions will be accepted without written departmental or college-level permission.**

The final grade for the course will be computed with the following weights:

Class Participation: 20%
Presentation: 15%

Current Events: 10%

Annotated Outline 10%

Rough Draft 10%
Final Paper: 35%

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Letter Grade | Grade Points | Numerical Scale | Criterion-referenced at grade level |
| A | 4.0 | 93-100 | Firm command of knowledge domain High level of analytical development |
| A- | 3.67 | 90-92.99 |
| B+ | 3.33 | 87-89 | Command of knowledge beyond minimum Advanced analytical development |
| B | 3.0 | 83-86 |
| B- | 2.67 | 80-82 |
|  C |  2.0 |  70-79 | Command of only basic concepts of knowledge Demonstrated basic analytical ability |
| F  | 0 | 69 and below | No command of knowledge domain |
| I | 0 |  | Failure to complete course requirements |

The following serve as guidelines in the assessment of students in the course.

**Papers:**

There are six cornerstones of a superior paper:

1. It establishes the relevant question clearly;
2. It answers the question in a highly analytical manner;
3. It proposes a well-defined thesis, stated early on;
4. It presents evidence to support that thesis;
5. It addresses, explicitly or implicitly, opposing arguments or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence (this constitutes a counterargument); and,
6. It accomplishes the above in a clear and well-organized fashion.

Standards for assessing student papers are as follows:

 A (93–100): Work of superior quality that contains original thought.

 A- (90–92): Work of high quality that demonstrates original thought.

 B+ (87–89): A sound effort which meets all six cornerstones above.

 B (83–86): A solid essay which is, on the whole, a successful consideration of the topic.

 B- (80–82): An essay that addresses the question and has a clearly-stated thesis, but which fails fully to support the thesis and either does not address counterarguments thoroughly, has serious structural flaws, or does not fully develop conclusions.

 C+ (77–79): Sufficiently analytical to distinguish it from a C, but lacks sufficient support, structure, analysis, or clarity.

 C (73–76): Expresses a reasonable argument but makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient adequately to explore the issue at hand.

 C- (70–72): Attempts to address the question but does not come to a responsible, defensible conclusion worthy of serious attention or is below average in one or more of the six cornerstones listed above to require significant remedial effort.

 F (69 and below): The submission does not merit graduate credit. Students may be asked to resubmit the essay.

**Class Contribution:**

The following standards are employed to assess student grades for seminar contribution:

 A (93-100): Strikes a good balance between “listening” and “contributing.” Demonstrates superior preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to group discussion. Frequently demonstrates insightful and original thought. Respects the opinions of others but challenges when appropriate.

 A- (90-92): Above the average expected of a graduate student. Well prepared for classroom discussion at each seminar session. Respects the views of colleagues and, by quality of contributions, commands their respect in return.

 B+ (87-89): A solid contributor to seminar sessions. Joins in most discussions. Contributions to group understanding of the topic and discussions reflect understanding of the material. Respectful of the views of others.

 B (83-86): Contributions to discussions reflect average preparation for class. Supports group efforts. Occasionally interrupts others.

 B- (80-82): Contributes. Often speaks out without having thought the issue through. Sometimes fails to show regard for a colleague’s opinions or proper consideration or courtesy toward others in the seminar group.

 C (70-79): Preparation is adequate, but frequently fails to respect the views of others, is sometimes belligerent in discourse with colleagues and/or instructor. Rarely steps forward to assume a fair share in group discussions. Usually content to let others form the class discussions and develop required seminar positions.

 F (69 and below): Class preparation and contributions do not merit graduate credit. Student will be referred to the faculty, faculty advisor or Dean of Students for counseling.

**Presentations:**

PowerPoint briefings are to be provided to the instructor electronically prior to the presentation, although there is no obligation to use PowerPoint.

Assessment of student presentations will employ the following criteria:

* Content: Does the briefing inform on the topic in an appropriate manner? Does it have a proper balance of detail?
* Delivery: Is delivery of the presentation smooth with few pauses? Does the briefer express a sense of confidence in the subject matter?
* Presence: Does the briefer interact with the audience and make eye contact?
* Use of Notes: Does the briefer employ notes with subtlety? Is the briefer able to present with minimal or no use of notes?
* Slides or Other Presentation Materials: Does the briefer use slides or other materials to support the presentation? If the briefer employs slides, are they visually interesting, informative and readable? How well does the briefer transition between slides?
* Timing: Does the briefer stay within the state time parameters?
* Questions: How well is the briefer able to respond to questions on the material covered in the brief? Has the briefer anticipated likely questions and counterarguments?
* Adaptability: Does the briefer exhibit grace under pressure—the ability to respond and forge ahead in the face of technical problems or to summarize and skip slides when time constraints arrive?

Standards for assessing student presentations are as follows:

 A (93-100): Work of superior quality that shows a high degree of original thought; presentation and supporting graphics set forth points in a well-organized, comprehensive yet sustainable manner.

 A- (90-92): Above the average expected of graduate work; contains original thought. An insightful presentation but one which has gaps that leave it short of an “A”.

 B+ (87-89): A sound effort which meets all criteria above; a well-executed presentation which includes complete analysis of the question.

 B (83-86): Average graduate performance. A solid presentation which is, on the whole, a successful consideration of the topic.

 B- (80-82): A presentation that addresses the assigned topic and has a clearly-stated point or narrative but which fails fully to support these and either does not address counterarguments thoroughly, has serious structural flaws, or does not fully develop conclusions.

 C (70-79): Expresses a responsible opinion but makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient adequately to explore the issue at hand.

 F (69 and below): The presentation is unrepresentative of the qualities expected of graduate-level work or fails to address the assigned topic. Resubmission is at the instructor’s discretion.

**Course Readings**

Robert Baer, *The Devil We know: Dealing With The New Iranian Superpower,* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2008).

Alistair Crooke, *Resistance the Essence of the Islamist Revolution,* (New York: Pluto Press, 2009).

Augustus Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

William Polk, *Understanding Iran,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

*Additional* ***Core*** *Readings will be delivered to all students via professor’s website.*

**Section I: Theory and History**

**Week 1: Introduction: Resistance as Grand Strategy**Our introductory session will accomplish two functions. First, we will go over the syllabus and come to a clear understanding of what the expectations and workload are for this course. Second, we will begin to examine the underlying concepts that frame Iranian grand strategy.

**Study Questions:**

1. What do we mean by grand strategy?
2. Does Iran have a grand strategy?
3. If so, is resistance a useful way to characterize Iranian grand strategy?

**Core reading:**

Peter D. Feaver., “Debating American Grand Strategy” *Foreign Policy Research Institute,* (Fall 2009); 547-552.

Hal Brands, “Evaluating Brazilian Grand Strategy under Lula” *Comparative Strategy,* 30:1, 28-49.

Alistair Crooke, *Resistance the Essence of the Islamist Revolution,* (New York: Pluto Press, 2009). 65-85.

**Supplemental reading:**

Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power,* (New York: Knopf, 1948).

Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); 8-65.

**Week 2: The History of Resistance**This session will explore Iranian history and examine the rise of the ideology of resistance and its grand strategy.

**Study Questions:**

1. How did the ideology and grand strategy of resistance emerge?

2. What does this history reveal about current Iranian strategic policy?

**Core reading:**

William Polk, *Understanding Iran,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

**Supplemental reading:**

Ervand Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran,* (Cambridge, 2008).

**Week 3: The Ideology of Resistance**

Building off of some of the concepts developed from the historical readings, in this session we explore the rise of the ideology of resistance.

**Study Questions:**

1. What role does resistance play in Iran’s strategic culture/identity?
2. According to Crooke, what is the genesis of this resistance?
3. How does the ideology of resistance shape Iranian grand strategy?

**Core reading:**

Alistair Crooke, *Resistance the Essence of the Islamist Revolution*, (New York: Pluto Press, 2009). 86-137 and 165-215.

**Supplemental reading:**

Ali Shari’ati, *On the Sociology of Islam,* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1979).

**Week 4: The Structure of Resistance**In this session, we will examine Iran’s security/strategic decision-making apparatus and structures. We examine in some depth Iran’s national security structure and how it is formed from an ideological basis. We look at the duplication of certain of institutions and roles as well as its hierarchical nature.

**Study Questions:**

1. What is designed redundancy?
2. To what extent does the ideology of resistance reach in Iran’s security/strategic structure?

**Core reading:**

David E. Thaler, et al., “Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics” *Rand Corporation,* (2010).

Jerrold D. Green, et al., “Understanding Iran” *Rand Corporation,* 2009.

**Supplemental reading:**

Eva Patricia Rakel, “Iranian Foreign Policy since the Iranian Islamic Revolution: 1979-2006” *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology,* (2007), 159-187.

Mehran Kamrava and Houchang Hassan-Yari, "Suspended Equilibrium in Iran's Political System," *The Muslim World,* Volume 94, October 2004, 495-524.

**Section II: Practice and Analysis**

**Week 5: Resistance Diplomacy: Allies and Adversaries I**This session focuses on Iran’s Axis of Resistance and its relationships with Russia, China, and India. Iran’s Axis of Resistance is a key manifestation of its grand strategy of resistance. And while Iran’s relationships with Russia, China, India, and Turkey may not be classic alliances, these relationships provide Iran significant diplomatic, economic, and even security advantages.

**Study Questions:**

1. To what extent do these relationships help Iran project power and thwart attempts to isolate it?
2. Do other major powers support Iran as a way to challenge the U.S.?
3. What is Iran’s grand strategic goal in these interactions?

**Core reading:**Marisa Sullivan, Hezb*ollah in Syria*, Middle East Security Report 19, April 2014.

Erik Mons and André Bank, “*Syrian Revolt Fallout: End of the Resistance Axis?”* Middle East Policy Council, Colum XIX, Number 3, Fall 2012.

Erica Downs and Suzanne Maloney, “Getting China to Sanction Iran,” *Foreign Affairs,* March/April (2011).

Abbas Milani, “Russian and Iran: An Anti-Western Alliance?” *Current History* (October, 2007); 328-332.

Tanvi Madan, “India’s Relationship with Iran: It’s Complicated,” *Brookings Middle East Politics and Policy* (February, 2014).

Gawdat Bahgat, “Iran-Turkey Energy Cooperation: Strategic Implications,” *Middle East Policy,* Vol. XXI, No. 4, Winter 2014, 121-132.

**Supplemental reading:**

John W. Garver, *China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World,* (Washington: University of Washington Press, 2006).

Hark N. Katz, Russian and Iran, *Middle East Policy*, V 19, No. 3 (Fall, 2012), 54-64.

**Week 6: Resistance Diplomacy: Allies and Adversaries II**
This week the readings focus on the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Iran and Israel and the regional strategic ramifications of those rivalries.

**Study Questions:**

1. Are Iran and Saudi Arabia in a Cold War?
2. Is Iran headed to war with either Israel or Saudi Arabia?
3. What are some of the strategic consequences of these rivalries?
4. What is Iran’s grand strategic goal in these interactions?

**Core reading:**

Reza Esktiari Amiri, “Arab Spring Geopolitical Implications for Iran,” *International Journal of Asian Social Science,* Vol. 2, No. 9, 1533-1547.

Frederic Wehrey, et al., “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy,” Rand Corporation, 2009.

Terrill, W. Andrew. "Deterrence in the Israeli-Iranian strategic standoff." Parameters Spring 2009: 81, 2015.

**Supplemental reading:**

Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, *Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring that Wasn’t.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

Ali al Shihabi, The Saudi Kingdom: Between the Jihadi Hammer and the Iranian Anvil” (London: The Choir Press, 2015).

Dalia Dassa Kaye, et al., Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry, Rand Corporation, 2011.

F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader, “Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East,” Rand Corporation, 2013.

**Week 7: Applied Ideology: Exporting Resistance**
This seminar focuses on Iran’s grand strategy of exporting its ideology of resistance. We finish Crooke’s book and get a sense of the power dynamics of resistance as well as the implication of power for negotiations. We then examine cases where Iran has used its power and influence to export the ideology of resistance.

**Study Questions:**

1. Is Iran leading a global resistance movement or is this posturing for more modest, realizable strategic ends?
2. Is resistance ideology separate/seperatable from security, economic, and other strategic considerations?
3. How successful has Iran been at exporting its ideology?

**Core reading:**

Alistair Crooke, *Resistance the Essence of the Islamist Revolution*, (New York: Pluto Press, 2009). 239-284.

Mohammad Ataie, “Revolutionary Iran’s 1979 Endeavor in Lebanon,” *In Middle East Policy*, Vol. 20 No. 2 (Summer, 2013); 137-157.

Milani, M. M., “Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan,” *The Middle East Journal*, 60(2), (2006), 235-256.

Babak Rahimi, “The Rise of Ayatollah Moqtada al-Sadr: What is the fiery cleric doing in Qom, Iran?” *Foreign Policy,* July 27, 2009.

Tim Arango, “Iran Presses for Official to Be Next Leader of Shiites” The New York Times, May 11, 2012.

**Supplemental reading:**

Holliday, Shabnam J. 2011. Defining Iran: Politics of resistance. Burlington, VT; Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate Pub.

**Week 8: The Vanguard of Resistance: Hizb'allah**
It is no secret that Hizb’allah is at the forefront of Iran’s efforts to project power in the Middle East region and globally. In this session we examine the origins and organization of one of the most successful resistance movements in history.

**Study Questions**

1. What are the key elements to Hizb’allah’s rise?
2. To what extent is Hizb’allah an Iranian proxy?
3. How do we assess Hizb’allah’s power and capabilities?

**Core reading:**

Augustus Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

**Supplemental reading:**

Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbu’llah Politics and Religion*, London: Pluto Press, 2002.

**Week 9: Hizb'allah as Model of Resistance: Iraq, Syria, and Beyond**This session will look at Iran’s strategy in replicating and Expanding its success with Hizb’allah.

**Study Questions:**

1. Is Iran using Hizb’allah as a model in Iraq and Syria?
2. How effective is this? How effective will it continue to be?

**Core reading:**

Will Fulton, “Iran’s Global Force Projection Network: IRGC Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah,” March 20, 2013

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, The Qods Force, 2012.

Babak Rahimi, “The Return of Moqtada al-Sadr and the Revival of the Mahdi Army,” Combating Terrorism Center, June 2010.

Sam Wyer, “The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq,” *Middle East Security Report 7*, December 2012.

International Centre for Political Violence, “Kata’ib Hezbollah Report,” March 2010.

Roger F. Noriega and José R. Cárdenas, “The Mounting Hezbollah Threat in Latin America,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, No. 3, October 2011.

Matthew Levitt, “Hizbullah narco-terrorism: a growing cross-border threat,” IHS Defense, Risk and Security Consulting, September 2012.

**Supplemental reading:**

Joint Publication 3-26, Counterterrorism, October 2014.

Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency, November 2013.

**Week 10: The Economy of Resistance: Sanctions**This session focuses on the number of sanctions that the UNSC has placed on Iran. Any grand strategy that Iran attempts is going to be hampered by a decrease in its economic power. The sanctions regime seem to indicate carrot and stick incentives for Iranian cooperation. This session seeks to better understand the sanctions regime and their effects.

**Study Questions:**

1. Are sanctions economic warfare?
2. What are the stated reasons for the sanctions? What will lifting them mean?
3. Are sanctions effective?

**Core reading:**

Cordesman, et al., *“The Sanctions Game: Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change”* Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2011.

Katzman, K. (2014). IRAN SANCTIONS. Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East, 5(1), 41-156.

UNSC Resolution 1696 (2006).

UNSC Resolution 1737 (2006).

UNSC Resolution 1747 (2007).

UNSC Resolution 1803 (2008).

UNSC Resolution 1929 (2010).

Amir Toumaj, “Iran’s Economy of Resistance: Implications for Future Sanctions,” Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute, 2014.

**Supplemental reading:**

Rowe, David M. "Economic Sanctions and International Security." The International Studies Encyclopedia. Denemark, Robert A. Blackwell Publishing, 2010. Blackwell Reference Online. 26 June 2012

**Week 11: Technology and Resistance: Nuclear**Coverage of Iran in the U.S. revolves in large part around its nuclear issues. As we saw in the economic section most of the sanctions and most of the pressure on Iran stems from their nuclear program. In this session we focus on Iran’s view of their nuclear program and negotiations with the West.

**Study Questions:**

1. What is the nature of Iran’s nuclear program?
2. What were/are the goals of negotiations with the West?
3. What is the role of ideology and prestige in Iran’s nuclear program?

**Core reading:**

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, *“The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir,”* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012. (Reprinted selected chapters.)

W. A. Rivera, “*Discursive Practices of Honor--Rethinking Iran’s Nuclear Program*,” Foreign Policy Analysis, forthcoming, 2015.

**Supplemental reading:**

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace,” London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2014.

Robert Litwak, “Iran’s Nuclear Chess: Calculating America’s Moves,” Wilson Center Middle East Program, 2014.

Dobbins, et al., “Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran” Rand Corporation, 2011.

**Week 12: Technology and Resistance: Cyber**

The Iranian nuclear program was the victim of the Stuxnet and Flame virus attack but soon rebounded. Iran claims to have learned from that attack and adapted their cyberwarfare capability accordingly. This session focuses on this capability and its use as part of Iran’s Grand Strategy.

**Study Questions:**

1. What is cyberwarfare?
2. How has Iran adapted from the Stuxnet and Flame viruses?
3. What is Iran’s cyberwarfare capability?

**Core reading:**

Y. Mansharof, “Iran’s Cyber War: Hackers in Service of the Regime,” The Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis Series Report No. 1012, August 2013.

Gabi Siboni and Sam Kronenfeld, “Iran’s Cyber Warfare,” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No. 375, October 2012.

Gabi Siboni and Sam Kronenfeld, “Developments in Iranian Cyber Warfare, 2013-2014” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No. 536, April 2014.

Gabi Siboni and Sam Kronenfeld, “Iranian Cyber Espionage: A Troubling New Escalation” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No. 561, June 2014.

Ilan Berman, “The Iranian Cyber Threat, Revisited,” Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, March 20, 2013.

Small Media, “Iranian Internet Infrastructure and Policy Report,” 2014.

**Supplemental reading:**

Nicole Perlroth, “Cyber Attacks from Iran and Gaza on Israel More Threatening than Anonymous’s Efforts,” The New York Times, November 20, 2012.

Open Briefing, “Iran’s cyber posture,” Open Briefing, Intelligence Brief, November 2013.

James Andrew Lewis, “Cybersecurity and Stability in the Gulf,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, Gulf Analysis Paper, January 2014.

**Section IV: U.S. Grand Strategy and Iran**

**Week 13: Strategic Interactions: Encountering, Engaging, Encircling**The next two sessions will address the future of U.S. and Iranian strategic interaction, applying what was learned thus far and examining approaches available to U.S. policymakers.

**Study Questions:**

* 1. What is Iranian Grand Strategy?
	2. How can U.S. grand strategic policy best account for Iranian grand strategy?

**Core reading:**

Robert Baer, *The Devil We know: Dealing With The New Iranian Superpower,* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2008)

Clifton W. Sherrill, “After Khamenei: Who Will Succeed Iran’s Supreme Leader?” *Elsevier Limited/Foreign Policy Research Institute,* Fall 2011, 631-647.

**Supplemental reading:**

Student Papers

**Week 14: Strategic Interactions: Encountering, Engaging, Encircling**This session is a continuation of the previous section. Additionally, it will summarize the course and give each student a chance to present research findings, and discuss implementation of research in terms of U.S. policy choices.

**Study Questions:**

1. What is Iranian Grand Strategy?
2. How can U.S. grand strategic policy best account for Iranian Grand Strategy?

**Core reading:**

Jon B. Alterman, Ed., “Gulf Kaleidoscope: Reflections on the Iranian Challenge,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 2012.

Joseph Cirincione and Andrew Grotto, "Contain and Engage: A New Strategy for Resolving the Nuclear Crisis with Iran,” Center for American Progress, 2007.

**Supplemental reading:**

Student Papers